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What is "General" Jurisprudence?
A Critique of Universalistic Claims by Philosophical Concepts of Law*

This essay compares two different types of general jurisprudence: one philosophical in orientation and the second with an empirical bent. These approaches are represented by two recent books: Scott Shapiro's Legality and William Twining's General Jurisprudence. I compare them along several axes, including their underlying theoretical assumptions, their concepts of law, the sources they draw upon, and their claims of general application. A deep tension exists between these two approaches: Shapiro claims to have identified the essential nature of law, which he grounds in state law, and he rejects sociological insights about the concept of law as irrelevant; Twining does not make essentialist claims, he encompasses various forms of law, and he incorporates sociological insights. According to the standards of the first type, the second type does not qualify as general jurisprudence because it does not involve the philosophical search for the essence of law. As this comparison will reveal, however, Shapiro's concept of law is identical in core respects to sociological approaches to law, and suffers from the same limitations. I argue, furthermore, that philosophical concepts of law tend to be highly parochial (despite their universalistic claims), and have potentially harmful real world consequences.
Jeremy Bentham set out to construct a jurisprudence that applied around the world; his disciple John Austin labeled this project "general jurisprudence" 1 (legal science), which has been a part of the legal positivist tradition ever since. There is, however, an ambiguity in what qualifies as "general" jurisprudence in contrast to "particular" jurisprudence 2 *For their helpful critical feedback on earlier drafts of this piece, I thank William Twining, Scott Shapiro, Larry Solum, Brian Bix, Fred Schauer, Dennis Patterson, Michael Guidice, and the faculties at the University of Miami School of Law, Illinois School of Law, and Minnesota School of Law.
-reflected in two distinct approaches that have an uneasy relationship.
human rights law, customary law, and other instantiations of law. William Twining's recent book, General Jurisprudence, is an example of this version. 6 These two types of general jurisprudence both claim to be about law in general, as H.L.A. Hart put it, "in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal system or legal culture." 7 Both types of general jurisprudence are within the legal positivist tradition.
(Work that focuses on a particular legal system is local, particular, or parochial jurisprudence.)
But they mean this in quite different senses. The first type claims to produce essential truths about law that apply across the universe, for all times and places and all legal systems, existent and non-existent; while the second type claims to bring within its purview forms of law around the globe as they actually exist. 8 They build on Bentham, Austin, and Hart, and they propound versions of the social sources thesis and the separation thesis. Their marked differences are explained by the contrasting orientations of their exponents: the former are legal philosophers who engage in analysis from intuitions to uncover truths about law, while the latter are legal theorists who freely draw upon sociological and anthropological insights in their effort to frame and understand law. 8 While this article focuses on the legal positivist tradition, it should be noted that non-positivists have also made essentialist and universalistic claims about the nature of law. For example, anti-positivist Robert Alexy writes: "Essential or necessary properties of law are those properties without which law would not be law. They must be there, quite apart from space and time, wherever and whenever law exists. Thus, necessary or essential properties are at the same time universal characteristics of law. Legal philosophy qua enquiry into the nature of law is, therefore, an enterprise universalistic in nature." Robert Alexy, "On the Concept and Nature of Law, 21 Ratio Juris 281,290 (2008) . 9 For the sake of convenience, throughout this article I will use "sociological" to include all the social scientific approaches that study the concept of law. 12 the defining characteristic of general jurisprudence. As Fred Schauer remarks in a review of 12 It is not entirely clear what qualifies one as an "analytical jurisprudent," although the label is often used. It appears to include mainly or exclusively legal philosophers in the legal positivist tradition. If this is correct, legal philosophers like Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, and Robert Alexy, do not qualify as analytical jurisprudents because they do not work in the legal positivist tradition; Frederick Schauer is a legal positivist and a legal philosopher, but he too seems to be excluded, perhaps because he does not believe law has an essential nature. All of these apparently excluded theorists engage in careful "analytical" work on topics in "jurisprudence," so application of the label appears to be arbitrary. Not all analytical jurisprudents reject the relevance of sociological insights (Guidice and Culver do not), but appears to be a broadly shared attitude in legal philosophy circles. 13 When legal philosophers claim "universal" application for their truths about law, they mean this literally.
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In the view of analytical jurisprudents who take this position, 18 15 Id., 615, quoting Raz, The Authority of Law, 104-05. 15 Jules Coleman acknowledges a stronger connection: "In the end, the purposes of philosophical inquiry need not, and probably will not, fully coincide with all of the purposes of the social sciences; but a satisfactory philosophical account should be continuous with these more naturalistic inquiries." Coleman, "Methodology," supra 337.
then, the second type of general jurisprudence has several fatal strikes against it. It covers only existing human societies, failing to reach all possible legal systems on all possible worlds, real and imaginary, at all possible times; it is too parochial, relying upon contingent sociological insights about law; and it fails to produce an account of the essential nature of law. An analytical jurisprudent in a generous mood might grant that legal theorists of the second type can also use the label general jurisprudence. But if pressed to be frank they would maintain that this labeling is misguided if not flat wrong.
It is outlandish, however, to suggest that a jurisprudential framework that encompasses multiple forms of law around the world is not universal enough because it covers only existing legal systems, failing to reach systems that do not exist. Incredibly, this cluster of views is held by some of the most prominent legal philosophers in the Anglo-American legal world.
A weird inversion of reality has taken place through the alchemy of philosophical reasoning. In essential respects, as I will show, the first type is consummately parochial while the second type is truly cosmopolitan. To set up my critical challenge to the assumptions held by first type of general jurisprudence, it is necessary to note that all concepts of law are parochial in a way that cannot be avoided. Legal philosophers agree that "law is a human construction." 19 The idea of conceptual relativity is an old and, I believe, a correct one. Any system of classification or individuation of objects, any set of categories for describing the world, indeed, any system of representation at all is conventional, and to that extent arbitrary. The world divides up in the way we divide it, and if we are ever inclined to think that our present way of dividing it is the right one, or is somehow inevitable, we can always imagine alternative systems of classification....Because any true description of the world will always be made within some vocabulary, some system of concepts, conceptual relativity has the consequence that any true description is always made relative to some system of concepts that we have more or less arbitrarily selected for describing the world.
As such, every concept of law has social origins that link it to a particular conceptual background. Philosopher John Searle explains: 20 While conceptual relativity cannot be avoided, this does not stop us from making truth claims.
The point, rather, is that there are situations in which it is important to remember that statements are true relative to the system of concepts upon which one relies. As we shall see, this has significant implications for the universal truth claims uttered by legal philosophers. What this underscores, however, is that the key move is the initial designation of the paradigm of law. Everything follows from this initial choice. 22 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra 1-17. 23 Raz, "On the Nature of Law," supra 1-5. 24 A general jurisprudence with genuinely global reach, Twining argues, must recognize the multiplicity of forms and manifestations of law that actually exist around the world today.
ALTERNATIVE STARTING POINTS FOR
Twining thus brings within his purview not just state law-heretofore the almost exclusive focus of analytical jurisprudents-but also global law, international law, transnational law, regional law, communal and inter-communal law, sub-state law, and non-state law. Twining identifies two important differences between his formulation and the approach taken by analytical jurists:
This formulation does not explicitly mention norms (or rules), systems (or orders), groups, or tradition. [Rules and systems are essential elements of law in analytical accounts.] This is not because they are unimportant as concepts or in practice. Far from it. They are all central to understanding law. They are not treated here as criteria of identification in order to make the formulation sufficiently broad to include some examples that arguably lack one or more of these elements. I mean, by 'General Jurisprudence,' the science concerned with the exposition of the principles, notions, and distinctions which are common to systems of law: understanding by systems of law, the ampler and maturer systems which, by reason of their amplitude and maturity, are pre-eminently pregnant with instruction. Shapiro's unique twist is to paint law as a planning system-sociologists typically portray law as serving a number of important social functions-but that overlay notwithstanding, the role he specifies for law in complex societies is indistinguishable from longstanding sociological accounts.
Identical to Shapiro's planning theory, furthermore, sociological concepts of law typically utilize form (or structure) and function-based criteria for the identification of law. Here, again, is his core theory of law: "what makes the law, understood here as a legal institution, the law is that it is a self-certifying compulsory planning organization whose aim is to solve those moral problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well, though alternative forms of social ordering." Shapiro relies upon a negative criterion in that he pegs the identification of law on the inadequacy of "non-legal" This move papers-over a lacunae in his analysis. A fairly common view among anthropologists and archeologists is that early chiefdoms (or strong man rule) often had institutionalized ordering systems which resembled extortion gangs that were religious-morallegal in a way that cannot be separated (relying upon divine sanction as well as physical force).
-claiming that law solves the insufficiency of "alternative forms of social ordering." Notice that this way of putting it, because it refers to the failure of non-legal forms of ordering, presupposes the capacity to distinguish legal from non-legal-but that is precisely what his theory of law is supposed to provide.
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It is not clear what Shapiro's theory of law would say about these mixed forms: if these gangsterlike run religious/moral compulsory systems were effective in ordering social behavior (as they typically were), then (per his negative criterion) it follows that they are not "law"; or, perhaps they qualify simultaneously as law and as religious/moral compulsory systems (which would throw doubt on the operation of his negative criterion). This problem arises for Shapiro because functional equivalents that share the same form-like institutionalized norm enforcement, or compulsory planning systems-can be distinguished from one another only through resort to additional identifying criteria which are not based upon the designated form and function alone. 66 Weber used public authority and coercive force to help distinguish religious and moral norm enforcement from law. Shapiro, who denies that coercive force is a necessary element of law, offers no additional criteria. As a consequence, Shapiro's theory of law irresistibly includes 65 See generally See Ian Morris, Why the West Rules-For Now (2010) . 66 This is explained in Tamanaha, "A Non-Essentialist Conception of Legal Pluralism," supra. 67 His approach generated a number of objections, including that public-private distinction is hard to pin down, and not all forms of law rely upon coercive force. Things get especially tricky when one considers the ubiquity of belief in divine sanctions, ordeals, and the like. 68 This is elaborated in Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Concept of Legal Pluralism," supra.
All sociological concepts 69 Id.
of law have been confronted by over-and under-inclusiveness, and Shapiro's philosophical concept is no exception.
In light of these fundamental similarities, the most pressing question is not why Shapiro so confidently declares that sociological concepts of law have "no relevance" for legal philosophers, but rather, whether there is any real difference between the two. 70 One set is produced by "philosophers" and the other by "sociologists," of course. But if field of origin determines the status of the concept, this implies the odd proposition that had a sociologist come up with the very same "planning theory of law," it would be deemed sociological rather philosophical. That cannot be right. My main hesitation about his argument is that I do not believe social science addresses or can answer the full range of issues that occupy analytical jurisprudence (although I fully agree with his skeptical arguments against analytical jurisprudence).
The fact that law is a human social construction inexorably draws the analytical back to the empirical because the philosopher's 71 If a sociologist adopted or utilized a philosophical concept of law, Shapiro could argue that it is no less philosophical in his construction of it. My argument is that, had a sociologist invented the identical planning theory of law (which is conceivable), it would be odd to conclude that, owing to its sociological heritage, the selfsame planning theory would instead be a sociological concept of law. 72 Jules Coleman, Methodology, supra 350. 73 I am not asserting that all legal philosophers take up these same issues, only that Shapiro's approach is representative of other leading analytical jurisprudents (particularly Raz). inconsistent with other equally true accounts produced by philosophers at other times (assuming each is correct).
Think of a European legal philosopher living during the Middle Ages, before the Westphalian state system developed, when it was normal to have coexisting, intersecting bodies of law operating in the same place (e.g. Roman law, Germanic law, customary law, canon law, manorial law, guild law, lex mercatoria). This is not just a fanciful thought experiment, for intuitions about law are not constant over time. Consider this claim by Shapiro: "in every legal system, there are individuals or bodies that have supreme authority, which is to say their authority trumps the authority of all other 82 In response to an earlier draft, Brian Bix correctly pointed out that there is a crucial distinction between "universally applicable" and "universally true." Raz makes the former claim, not the latter, holding that a theory of law that is necessarily true relative to "our" concept of law (hence not universally true) can be applied to evaluate other systems (hence universally applicable). As I will demonstrate in the final section, however, this distinction is easily lost because the very claim of universal application carries the connotation that the concept of law is true universally (such that it provides a valid standard against which to evaluate other systems unified legal systems, and it is far from evident that there is a supreme legal authority on all legal matters within each system (assuming lines can be drawn to delimit discrete systems). 87 As a prominent theorist noted, "For the most part national courts have not accepted that EU Law is the supreme law of the land. But nor have they simply assumed that national constitutional law is the supreme law of the land;" 88 EU and national courts sometimes take contrary position on the same issue, without a supreme legal authority to reconcile the matter. Constitutional pluralism is a hotly debated topic among European theorists for these reasons. 89 The undeniable reality that social manifestations of law change-hence intuitions and truisms about law change-means that every concept of law is a product of its time. not self-evident with respect to any of these systems. 93 International law is notoriously fragmented, with multiple tribunals having overlapping jurisdiction over the same matters and no final overarching authority to reconcile all possible inconsistencies. 94 Romani law governs the affairs of gypsies in many countries across Europe, but these autonomous bodies of law, in which most disputes are resolved by informal tribunals, lack a supreme legal authority. 95 Similar questions about supremacy, as well as a number of Shapiro's other "truisms" about law, can be raised with respect to customary law in many societies today, which handle the overwhelming bulk of social disputes (dealing with rape, domestic violence, theft, fights, murder, and witchcraft). 
WHY IT MATTERS
To appreciate why it is important to refute the methodological claims of analytical jurisprudents who espouse these views, we must return to the notion of conceptual relativity set forth by Searle-that any set of descriptions is relative to some vocabulary and system of concepts. Because there is no escape from this, in most contexts the fact of conceptual relativity doesn't matter: assertions about truth can be stated without reservation because it goes without saying that these assertions are relative to a background conceptual scheme. Sometimes it matters a great deal, however.
When Shapiro applies his theory of law to an alien civilization, he can correctly proclaim that any social institution on Planet X that meets his criteria for the legal planning system constitutes law. That's not the end of the discussion. It is also correct-nay, it is more precisely correct-to assert that they have law according to our conception of what law is.
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But that depends upon why we are asking whether aliens on Planet X have law. Let's say that we are trying to decide whether the alien society has law because we have determined that if not we will be justified in imposing our own (superior) legal system upon them. In this scenario, Shapiro might respond that the second formulation is unnecessarily wordy because it comes to the same thing; since we recognize conceptual relativity, which is unavoidable, nothing is added by making it explicit. 98 The most narrowly correct statement is that the alien civilization has a compulsory planning system. the reminder that we are not talking about "law" in universal terms, but rather are applying our Naturally, the essential properties of the law are universal characteristics of law. They are to be found in law wherever and whenever it exists. Moreover, these properties are universal properties of the law not accidentally, and not because of any prevailing economic or social circumstances, but because there is not law without them….When surveying the different forms of social organization in different societies throughout the ages we will find many which resemble the law in various ways. Yet if they lack the essential features of the law, they are not legal systems.
Shapiro (as well as Hart) asserts that primitive societies do not have law because law is a special form of social organization that arises only in complex societies. Blackburn was actually wrong in his appraisal, for according to Shapiro's universally applicable concept of law the Aborigines had no legal system at all. Raz's position also leads to that conclusion:
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The above examples demonstrate why it is so problematic to make such assertions.
Conceptual relativity must not be forgotten. Nothing of moment in the real world appears to be at stake when legal philosophers claim that their universally true theory of law applies to alien civilizations and non-existent systems. But it is imperative to get it right because real consequences can follow from such claims. The correct assertion is that, according to criteria drawn from the philosopher's own culturally generated intuitions about law, the particular institution being examined does not qualify as "law." This more explicit phraseology provides full notice, highlighting the fact that beneath it all the philosopher is asserting that his intuitions about law trump others. The confident insistence by analytical jurisprudents that they have identified necessary truths about the nature of law has the effect of clothing a parochial conception of law in universalistic dress to serve as a standard for all times and places.
Another indication that their conception of law is parochial can be found in Australia's subsequent treatment of customary law. After the Gove land rights case, the Attorney General These various examples demonstrate that the notion of customary law is broadly acceptable in societies and legal systems which are familiar with it; the Western legal philosophers who firmly deny its existence as a form of law have less exposure to it as a reality on the ground.
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Twining's formulation, it must be said, has no difficulty recognizing that Aborigines have law because he purposefully constructed his account to encompass various conceptions of law, including customary law. His account thus has broader application, while still incorporating theories of law based upon state law, and it is not normatively problematic because he issues no universalistic assertions. have said nothing to defend the mysterious idea on what this is all premised, which is that law has an essential structure that can be exposed purely through description….Until someone redeems that claim through an intelligible account of the 'nature' or 'essence' of law, it will remain only a comforting mantra: positivism's phlogiston."
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The two streams of general jurisprudence elaborated on in this essay share a core baseline, as demonstrated by the striking similarities between sociological and philosophical concepts of law. A theoretical approach which does not assume that law has a nature, and which strives to accommodate the variety of legal forms in circulation around the globe, is an informative type of general jurisprudence that can undoubtedly inform the work of analytical jurisprudents.
